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concerned. The Arctic's inhospitable climate created natural barriers
for the activities of man and limited the usefulness of available
technology. At present, however, climate change seems to be
responsible for a marked heating up, not only of the physical
environment of the Arctic, but of the political tensions concerning the
exact legal regime to be applied in the region.
This Article will examine the present-day legal status of the
Arctic. Since almost all territorial claims have been settled in the
area,2 only Arctic water areas will retain our attention. And, within the
1. Or moving the issue "to the front burner again before long" as predicted by
one author. Jeremy Kinsman, Who is My Neighbour? Trudeau and Foreign Policy,
57 INT'LJ. 57,66 (2001).
2. The only outstanding issue at present as far as land territory is concerned
appears to be Hans Island. See, e.g., Donald McRae, Arctic Sovereignty? What is at
Stake?, 64 BEHIND THE HEADLINES 1, 3 (2007). Hans Island, less than a mile in
length north to south, is located midway between Greenland and Ellesmere Island in
Kennedy Channel at 80049' N. In 1973, when Denmark and Canada delimited their
maritime boundary in the area, Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf Between Greenland and Canada, Den.-Can., Dec. 17, 1973, 950
U.N.T.S. 147, neither side appeared willing to press the issue of sovereignty over the
island.
As a result, the delimitation in the area surrounding the island was left
undetermined, Canada-Denmark (Greenland): Report Number 1-1, in 1
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 371, 372 (Jonathan I. Charney & Lewis M.
Alexander eds., 1993), and is still contested today. See generally Christopher
Stevenson, Hans Off': The Struggle for Hans Island and the Potential Ramifications
for International Border Dispute Resolution, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 263
(2007). Whether Wrangel and a few other Arctic islands located off the northern far
eastern coast of Russia have to be mentioned here is less clear. ERIK FRANCKX,
MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE ARCTIC: CANADIAN AND RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES 143-44
(1993) (analyzing the issue in relation to the 1990 maritime boundary agreement
between the former Soviet Union and the United States); Agreement on the
Maritime Boundary, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 1, 1990, 17 LAW OF THE SEA BULL. 15
(provisionally entered into force June 15, 1990). On December 23, 1994, the
Supreme Court of Alaska finally dismissed-based on the following argument-a
later claim introduced by an individual wanting to register his interests in five of
these islands in the Nome Recording District:
The question of sovereignty over the Arctic Islands is a subject committed
to the executive and legislative branches of the United States
government ..... Until and unless the United States government indicates
that the Arctic Islands are part of the State of Alaska, the State has no duty
to accept for recording documents affecting title to real property on the
islands.
Denardo v. State, 887 P.2d 947, 949 (Alaska 1994) (citations omitted).
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multitude of possible offshore activities, this Article will focus solely
on navigation. Part I discusses the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, which seems to have finally become a
generally accepted legal cornerstone for appreciating the legal status
of these waters. Part I considers climate change in the Arctic and Part
III elaborates on how this may impact the legal regime of navigation
there. Subsequently, Part IV analyzes the vulnerability as well as the
adaptive capacity of the 1982 Convention. Finally, Part V suggests
how the existing legal system can better meet the new challenges
climate change poses for Arctic water expanses.
I. THE 1982 CONVENTION
In contrast to the Antarctic, where international cooperation has
formed the essence of the development of a very specific international
legal regime applicable in the area, as evidenced in a good number of
international agreements, the Arctic generally lacks such an integrated
and comprehensive regime based on regional multilateral
cooperation.4 Moreover, it is startling to see that the polar bear, which
triggered the conclusion of the first multilateral instrument joining all
five Arctic rim countries,' has become the face of the campaign trying
to stop climate change in the Arctic. This implies that if this quest to
A 2003 statement published by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs seems to indicate that the government has no such
intention, for it states that these islands have never been claimed by the United
States. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of State, Status of Wrangel and Other Arctic Islands
(May 20, 2003). A recent review of the question by Russian scholars comes to the
conclusion that these claims find no basis in international law. Russian sovereignty,
they argue, is widely recognized and based on prolonged possession. Egorov, N. P.,
Kolodkin, A. L., Mikhina, I. N. & Vylegzhanin, A. N., Pravovoi Rezhim
Sudokhodstva v Arktiki [The Legal Regime of Navigation in the Arctic], in
PROBLEMY SEVERNOGO MORSKOGO PUTI 482, 489-90 (Alexander G. Granberg &
Vladimir I. Peresypkin eds., 2006).
3. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter 1982
Convention].
4. See DONALD R. ROTHWELL, THE POLAR REGIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 221 (1996).
5. See Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 13
I.L.M. 13 (entered into force on May 26, 1976). The parties to this agreement are:
Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russian Federation and United States of America. Id.
2011] 399
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stop climate change were to be unsuccessful,6 one of the few hard law
instruments specifically conceived of for the Arctic will disappear
together with its object, the polar bear. The preferred method of
regional cooperation in the Arctic has recently been coined "soft
sleddings," a process expected to continue during the next decade.7
And no matter how significant this "mosaic of cooperative
arrangements" might be,' binding hard law instruments remain an
Arctic rarity.
This does not mean that the Arctic is a free for all, located beyond
the confines of international law.9 On the contrary, a clear tendency
can be discerned during the last decade or so toward a common
acceptance by countries in general, and more importantly the Arctic
rim countries in particular, that the 1982 Convention contains the
generally applicable legal framework in the area.
First of all, this latter tendency has to do with states' attitudes
toward the instrument itself. The 1982 Convention, envisioned to
6. In the United States, the struggle to protect the polar bear focuses at present
on the bear's listing as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. See
generally Brendan R. Cummings & Kassie R. Siegel, Ursus Maritimus: Polar Bears
on Thin Ice, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T. 3 (2007); Laura Navarro, What About the
Polar Bears? The Future of the Polar Bears as Predicted by a Survey of Success
under the Endangered Species Act, 19 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 169 (2008); Justin Olsson,
The Future of the Polar Bear Rests on Thin Ice: Listing Under the ESA and its
Impacts, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 46 (2007); Nigel Bankes, Climate
Change and the Regime for the Conservation of Polar Bears, in CLIMATE
GOVERNANCE IN THE ARCTIC, supra note *, at 351.
7. Timo Koivurova & David L. VanderZwaag, The Arctic Council at 10
Years: Retrospect and Prospects, 40 U.B.C. L. REV. 121, 191 (2007).
8. Oran R. Young, Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic
of Cooperation, 11 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 9, 14 (2005).
9. This idea is sometimes implied in recent analyses of this issue. See, e.g.,
Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of
Global Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63, 74 (2008) (calling the Arctic a "legal no
man's land"). After having stated that the Arctic is "not currently governed by any
comprehensive multilateral norms and regulations," and affirmed that "there are
currently no overarching . . . legal structures that can provide for the orderly
development of the region," the author subsequently mentions the 1982 Convention,
which, according to him, "cannot be seamlessly applied to the Arctic." Id. at 65, 71-
72. But, all the examples given to prove this latter point, namely the division of the
continental shelf, regime of navigation, maritime boundary delimitation, and the
issue of flags of convenience, are all elements that this convention addresses either
directly, or by reference to other competent international organizations. Id. at 72.
4
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become the Constitution for the Oceans,o seems well on its way to
achieving that status." Moreover, when focusing on the Arctic rim
countries proper, it appears that while Norway and the Russian
Federation ratified that convention during the second half of the
1990s, 12 Canada and Denmark did so only more recently." None of
these countries included a direct reference to the Arctic in any of their
declarations made upon signature or ratification. 14 As of today, the
United States is the only Arctic rim country that is not yet a party to
the 1982 Convention, despite the recent presidential initiative in this
10. Conference Report, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea A Constitution for the Oceans, , (Dec. 6 & 11, 1982) (statement of Tommy T.B.
Koh, Pres. of Third U.N. Conf. on Law of the Sea),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/koh-english.pdf.
11. At the time of this writing, 154 states and the European Union are bound
by this legal instrument. United Nations, Chronological Lists of Ratifications of,
Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/chronological lists-of ratifications.htm
(last updated Nov. 15, 2010).
12. These countries ratified the 1982 Convention on June 24, 1996 and March
12, 1997, respectively. United Nations Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the
Sea, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention, and of the
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention Relating to
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/
status2010.pdf.
13. Namely on November 7, 2003, and November 16, 2004, respectively. Id.
14. Given its particular importance with respect to the Arctic, it might
nevertheless be appropriate to highlight the fact that the Russian Federation
specifically inserted between "sea boundary delimitations" and "disputes concerning
military activities," (both excluded on the basis of Article 298, Section (1)(a)(i)
["Art. 298 (1)(a)(i)"] of the 1982 Convention in its declaration made at the time of
signature) "historic bays or titles" when rephrasing its declaration at the time of
ratification. United Nations, Declarations and Statements (2010),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/conventiondeclarations.htm
[hereinafter U.N. Declarations]. Also, this latter addition, it should be noted, is in
full conformity with the provision of Art. 298 (1)(a)(i). See 1982 Convention, supra
note 3, at art. 298(l)(a)(i). Canada also included "historic bays or titles" in its list of
exclusion at the time of ratification. Although not exclusively linked to the Arctic, it
might be noted that both countries also added delimitation issues to the list, as
provided by the same article. See U.N. Declarations, supra.
2011] 401
5
Franckx: Should the Law Governing Maritime Areas in the Arctic Adapt to Ch
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2011
402 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
respect.15 It is noteworthy that the Arctic ranks high on the agenda of
some authors who presently want to speed up this process.' 6
Nevertheless, this absence of ratification by one of the major actors in
the region does not put into question the tendency toward common
acceptance of the 1982 Convention as the generally applicable legal
framework in the area, as the United States has always agreed to abide
by the vast majority of the provisions of the 1982 Convention 7 and
clearly considered this agreement to govern the Arctic as well."
Secondly, the 1982 Convention seems to have become the
quintessential document when scholars address the legal regime of the
Arctic.19 Especially since Canada and the Russian Federation-the
15. The road followed by the United States to the ratification of the 1982
Convention has been a tortuous one indeed. See, e.g., David D. Caron & Harry N.
Scheiber, The United States and the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, INSIGHTS, June 11,
2007, available at http://asil.org/insights/2007/06/insights070611.html; see also
John E. Noyes, U.S. Policy and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 621 (2007).
16. See, e.g., Candace L. Bates, Comment, U.S. Ratification of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea: Passive Acceptance Is Not Enough to Protect
U.S. Property Interests, 31 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 745, 767, 779-80 (2006).
See generally Andrew King, Comment, Thawing a Frozen Treaty: Protecting
United States Interests in the Arctic with a Congressional-Executive Agreement on
the Law of the Sea, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329 (2007).
17. This occurred when the United States proclaimed an exclusive economic
zone. See United States: Proclamation on an Exclusive Economic Zone, Mar. 10,
1983, 22 I.L.M. 461. The President seized the occasion to make a much broader
statement on the U.S. oceans policy in general, in which he clearly indicated that,
besides Part XI (The Area), the United States was prepared to accept the
conventional rules on the basis of reciprocity. Id. at 464-65 (statement of Ronald
Reagan, President of the United States).
18. A map accompanying the 1983 Proclamation, for instance, included the
Arctic in the area of application of this novel concept. Id. at 463 (detailing a
"[s]ketch map showing approximate outlines of Exclusive Economic Zone of the
United States, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands and United States overseas possessions.").
19. Hans Corell, the former Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and the
Legal Counsel of the United Nations, stressed this point at several recent occasions
when discussing the legal regime of the Arctic. See, e.g., Hans Corell, Former
Under Sec'y Gen. for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the United Nations,
Address at the Seventh Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region,
Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a Binding Legal Regime for the
Arctic 3 (Aug. 3, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.arcticparl.org/_res/
site/File/ static/conf7_hans-corell.pdf) ("The title of my presentation is framed in a
6
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two gate holders of the Northwest and Northeast Passage,
respectively-have become parties to this convention, 20 legal scholars
in these two countries tend to found their legal analyses on this
particular document. All recent articles, mentioned in this Article and
written by Canadian authors, rely on the 1982 Convention for at least
some part of their argumentation.21
With respect to Soviet authors, this latter tendency is even more
remarkable. A careful analysis of Soviet and Russian doctrine up to
the summer of 1992 reveals that in the late 1980s some changes
occurred in the writings of Soviet jurists. With respect to the sector
principle, for instance, the broad reading of the 1926 Decree 22
(subsuming water areas to be included in a decree that only explicitly
mentioned lands and islands),23 was later mitigated by Soviet writers.
Indeed, writings started to deny that the so-called lateral sector lines
manner that seems to suggest that there is no binding legal regime for the Arctic. But
the fact is that there is already a wide-ranging legal regime that applies there, in
particular the [1982 Convention].").
20. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
21. For some outspoken recent examples, see, for instance, McRae, supra note
2, at 4 ("The basic framework for the oceans is set out in the 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea, to which Canada is a party, although the treaty provisions of that
Convention are also intertwined with principles of customary international law, a
matter that is particularly important when dealing with the United States, which has
yet to become party to the 1982 Convention.") and Gillian MacNeil, Comment, The
Northwest Passage: Sovereign Seaway or International Strait? A Reassessment of
the Legal Status, 15 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 204, 217 (2006) ("[A]s Canada is a
party to [the 1982 Convention], the treaty provisions are the logical place to begin
an examination of the validity of its position over the Northwest Passage in
International law.").
But even if no such explicit recognition is attributed to the 1982
Convention, as for instance in the authoritative recent article of Professor Pharand, it
is clear that Pharand very much relies on its provisions either to confirm their
application or to argue why Canada is sometimes believed to be exonerated from
their application. See generally Donat Pharand, The Arctic Waters and the
Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit, 38 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L LAW 3 (2007).
22. On the Proclamation of Lands and Islands Located in the Northern Arctic
Ocean as Territory of the U.S.S.R., April 15, 1926, reprinted in N. D. KOROLEVA, V.
I. MARKOV, ALEXANDER P. USHAKOV. PRAVOVOI REZHIM SUDOCHODSTVA V
RossIIsKoI ARKTIKE [LEGAL REGIME OF NAVIGATION IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC] 105
(1995) [hereinafter 1926 Decree] (containing both the Russian text and English
translation).
23. See generally FRANCKX, supra note 2, at 152-53.
2011]1 403
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constituted state boundaries, but still always mentioned the
1926 Decree when discussing the legal status of Arctic maritime
areas. 24 If one browses through the Russian doctrine between 1998
and 2008, one could note further developments in this respect.25 The
recently published, authoritative textbook on the law of the sea by
Kolodkin,26 Gutsuliak,27 and Bobrova28 refers back to what the
authors call the correct opinions of Molodtsov (who outright states
that this decree does not touch upon the question of the legal status of
the water areas so included) and Maleev (who adds that the sector
lines did not constitute state boundaries), 29 even though it still reprints
the 1926 Decree.30 The book of KovaleV,31 first published in 2003
24. Id. at 168-69.
25. An overview of the period up to 1997 stated "that it is possible to conclude
that a revision of the Arctic sector concept is occurring." Leonid Timchenko, The
Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past and Present, 50 ARCTIC 29, 33 (1997).
26. Professor Anatoly Kolodkin is judge at the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea as well as the President of the Russian Associations of International
Law and International Law of the Sea. See ANATOLY L. KOLODKIN, VASILI N.
GUTSULIAK, & I. V. BOBROVA, MIROVOI OKEAN. MEZHDUNARODNO-PRAVOVOI
REZHIM. OSNOVNYE PROBLEMY [THE WORLD OCEAN. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
REGIME. BASIC PROBLEMS] 2 (2007).
27. Professor Vasili Gutsuliak is affiliated with the Institute of State and Law
of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Id.
28. Ms. Julya Bobrova is Chief-Specialist at the Ministry of Transport. She is
also affiliated with the Department of International Sea and River Law of the
Moscow State Academy for Water Transport. Id.
29. Id. at 261-62.
30. Id. at 261. This connection, often encountered in Russian writings, is rather
awkward. It is illogical to refer to a decree, which is now accepted not to concern
water expanses, when stating one's maritime policy in the Arctic. See Erik Franckx,
Nature Protection in the Arctic: Recent Soviet Legislation, 41 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
366, 372 (1992). Others, however, have explained this reproduction of the 1926
Decree in the 1986 Soviet Notices to Mariners as appropriate and necessary in order
to indicate that the territorial sea around these islands was Soviet and to control
navigation of foreign warships. See Timchenko, supra note 25, at 33. But since all
territorial claims had long since been settled in that area, the relevance of such
argumentation in the past is to be doubted. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
This is true even if Wrangel is considered, as this island is not one in which the
regime of innocent passage is of particular relevance (similar to other islands with
overlapping territorial seas or straight baselines linking the island to the mainland).
A fortiori, such argumentation is no longer convincing at present because of
the Russian acceptance of the right of innocent passage of warships in the territorial
sea in the meantime. See generally Erik Franckx, Further Steps in the Clarification
8
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and translated into English a year later, takes a similar approach and
adds:
[I]t follows, in our view, that one should proceed from the fact that
the maritime expanses of the Northern Arctic Ocean are by their
legal status subdivided into those same categories as the water
expanses of the entire World Ocean, the legal regime of which is
provided for in the 1982 [Convention].32
It seems therefore safe to conclude that the latter idea is generally
adhered to today in Russian doctrine.33
In 2001, when Robin Churchill considered whether claims to
maritime zones in the Arctic were to be considered as law of the sea
normality or polar peculiarity, he had no difficulty in concluding that
maritime zones were a law of the sea normality. Even if Canada and
Russia might be considered somewhat ambiguous in this regard,
Churchill nevertheless concluded that "this ambiguity stems more
from writers (and primarily from writers of the past) than their
governments." 34 The present findings seem to further confirm these
of the Soviet Position on the Innocent Passage of Foreign Warships Through Its
Territorial Waters, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 535 (1989); Erik Franckx, Innocent
Passage of Warships: Recent Developments in U.S.-Soviet Relations, 14 MARINE
POL'Y 484 (1990); FRANCKX, supra note 2, at 163-67; Erik Franckx, Onschuldige
doorvaart van oorlogsschepen in de territoriale zee: herwaardeert de U.S.S.R. de
inhoud van in onbruik vervallen teksten? [Innocent Passage of Warships in the
Territorial Sea: Did the U.S.S.R. Revaluate the Content of Texts that had Fallen into
Oblivion?], 18 BELGIAN REv. OF INT'L L. 272 (1984); Erik Franckx, The U.S.S.R.
Position on the Issue of Innocent Passage of Warships Through Foreign Territorial
Waters, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 33 (1987)..
31. A. A. KOVALEV, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE LAW OF THE SEA:
MODERN RUSSIAN APPROACHES (W. E. Butler ed. & trans., 2004). The author
paraphrases the 1926 Decree and says the sector lines do not to constitute state
boundaries. Id. at 178-79.
32. Id. at 182.
33. Of course, dissonant voices will always be heard-for example, A. V.
Ovlashchenko & I. F. Pokrovskii, Problemy pravovogo rezhima severnogo
morskogo puti (k provedeniiu mezhdunarodnogo poliarnogo goda (200 7-2008 G.G)
[Problems of the Legal Regime of the Northern Sea Route (at the Occasion of the
International Polar Year 2007-2008)], 2 TRANSPORTNOE PRAVO 21-26 (2007)-but
definitively seem to represent a minority opinion at present.
34. Robin R. Churchill, Claims to Maritime Zones in the Arctic: Law of the
Sea Normality or Polar Peculiarity?, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND POLAR
2011] 405
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conclusions, namely that the 1982 Convention contains the generally
applicable legal framework for the Arctic. It seems no longer
warranted to differentiate the claims of Canada (namely the
straightforward application of the general principles contained therein)
and Russia (where no such clear-cut conclusion is reached but rather
replaced by a much more qualified statement)35 as to the effect of the
1982 Convention of the Arctic's ratifcation.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE
The findings of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment are starting
points with respect to climate change. These findings were the result
of an international project between the Arctic Council and the
International Arctic Science Committee, which were released in
November 2004.36 Based on this detailed scientific analysis, a
synthesis report put forward some practical conclusions by means of
so-called key findings.37 Key Finding Number 6 of the synthesis
report, entitled Reduced Sea Ice is Very Likely to Increase Marine
Transport and Access to Resources, 3 is of particular relevance here. It
notes a 5-10% estimated reduction in annual average sea-ice extent,
most prominent in summer, as well as a 10-15% reduction in average
thickness over the past few decades, with a 40% reduction in the
central Arctic Ocean. 39 Based on this data, longer seasons of less sea-
ice cover of reduced thickness are expected, "implying improved ship
accessibility around the margins of the Arctic Basin (although this will
not be uniformly distributed)." 40 This parenthetical caveat is further
MARITIME DELIMITATION AND JURISDICTION 105, 124 (Alexander G. Oude Elferink
& Donald R. Rothwell eds., 2001).
35. See Fabienne Quiller6-Majzoub, Glaces polaires et icebergs: Quid juris
gentium?, 52 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 432, 436-37 (2006).
36. See generally ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Carolyn Symon et
al., eds., 2005), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu/pages/scientific.html.
37. IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
(Susan J. Hassol ed., 2004), available at http://amap.no/acia (follow the "Impacts of
a Warming Arctic" hyperlink, then follow hyperlinks for individual sections).
38. Id. at 82-85.
39. Id. at 82.
40. Id.
10
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clarified in the report by distinguishing the Northern Sea Route, on the
one hand, from the Northwest Passage on the other.41
As far as the Northern Sea Route is concerned, it is predicted that
based on models derived from the above-made observations, the
number of navigable days (days per year with less than 50% sea-ice
concentration) will increase from 20-30 days in 2004 to 90-100 days
in 2080.42 And, since icebreakers are able to manage waters with a
sea-ice concentration of 75%, this would in fact open up the Northern
Sea Route to 150 days by 2080.43
The picture with respect to the Northwest Passage, however, is
much more nuanced because the ice conditions in this part of the
Arctic are less predictable. First of all, the Canadian Arctic is
characterized by a high year-to-year variability despite the general
decrease in sea-ice tendency since the late 1960s.44 Moreover, because
of the restricted nature of the waters inside the Canadian northern
islands, the melting tendency could result in more icebergs moving
into the routes normally used for navigation. 45 With respect to the
Northwest Passage, the synthesis concludes that "despite widespread
retreat of sea ice around the Arctic Basin, it is clear that the unusual
geography of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago creates exceptionally
complex sea ice conditions and a high degree of variability for the
decades ahead." 46
More recent findings not only seem to sustain these predictions,
but even predict an acceleration of the expected timescale of their
realization. The exceptional summer melt of 2007 made scientists
believe that summer ice might not even make it to 2050.47 Because of
warmer ocean waters and higher spring temperatures over the Russian
part of the Arctic during the spring of 2007, for example, summers
41. Id.
42. Id. at 83.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 84.
45. Id. at 85.
46. Id.
47. Richard A. Kerr, Is Battered Arctic Sea Ice Down for the Count?,
SCIENCE, Oct. 5, 2007, at 33-34.
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without sea ice are now being predicted as soon as within the next
forty years.48
This contrasts sharply with the possibility raised in 2004 that in
place of an ice-free summer, changing climate patterns could instead
usher in a new ice-age. 49 But, this scenario seems so farfetched that
the scientific community reacted by characterizing it as highly
unlikely.50 Other phenomena may have been speeding up the present
increase in melting, such as prevailing wind patterns during the 1990s,
which might predict a slowdown in the melt rate in the future.5 Other
scientists suggest a more cyclic temporary reprieve.5 2 Still, others
emphasize that there is a lack of spatial uniformity in the melting
pattern of, for instance, the Northwest Passage itself.5 3 Nevertheless,
the general trend towards "a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean as the
system warms seems increasingly certain. The unresolved questions
regard when this new arctic state will be realized, how rapid the
48. Daniel Cressey, Arctic Melt Opens Northwest Passage, NATURE, Sept. 20,
2007, at 267.
49. See generally PETER SCHWARTZ & DOUG RANDALL, AN ABRUPT CLIMATE
CHANGE SCENARIO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL
SECURITY (2003), available at http://www.climate.org/PDF/clim-change
scenario.pdf. The argument is that because of the melting ice, freshwater will change
the structure of the usually salty and dense waters in the North and cause a
thermohaline circulation collapse, preventing the warm Gulf stream from reaching
the Arctic basin any longer. This scenario was picked up in the press afterwards.
See, e.g., David Stipp, The Pentagon's Weather Nightmare. The Climate Could
Change Radically, and Fast. That Would Be the Mother of All National Security
Issues, FORTUNE, Feb. 4, 2004, at 100, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2004/02/09/360120/index.
htm.
50. See, e.g., Wallace S. Broecker, Letter to the Editor, Future Global
Warming Scenarios, SCIENCE, Apr. 16, 2004, at 388. In a reply, Schwartz and
Randall stated that the purpose of their report was not to further climate science, but
rather to imagine the unthinkable. Peter Schwartz & Doug Randall, Future Global
Warming Scenarios, Take 2, SCIENCE, Sept. 24, 2004, at 1911. Or, to use their own
words: "We have created a climate change scenario that although not the most
likely, is plausible." Id.
51. Richard A. Kerr, Scary Arctic Ice Loss? Blame the Wind, SCIENCE, Jan.
14, 2005, at 203.
52. Could Mother Nature Give the Warming Arctic a Reprieve?, SCIENCE, Jan.
5, 2007, at 36.
53. Michael Bravo & Gareth Rees, Cryo-Politics: Environmental Security and
the Future ofArctic Navigation, 13 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 205, 206 (2006).
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transition will be, and what will be the impacts of this new state on the
Arctic and the rest of the globe."5 4
Certainly, the dramatic rate at which melting has occurred lately
has clear implications for navigation in the area. Satellite images
captured during the exceptional summer of 2007 clearly indicate that
the whole Northern Sea Route, including its natural choke point,
Vil'kitskii Strait,5 was totally ice-free.56 Even more surprising, during
the summer of 2007, the Northwest Passage was totally ice-free as
well.5
III. PROJECTED CONSEQUENCES IN THE LEGAL SPHERE
One can assume with reasonable certainty that the Arctic ice will
diminish in extent, as well as in thickness, during the years to come.
Even though the exact timeframe remains open to conjecture, the
effects this will have on the legal regime of navigation in the Arctic
seem considerable. At least five submissions can be made in this
respect.5 8 First, as navigation becomes more intensive, the urge to
conclude maritime boundary agreements will increase accordingly. As
of now, almost all of these boundaries are awaiting final settlement.
Secondly, present-day solutions to navigational problems will soon
become totally insufficient. The so-called "agreement to disagree" 59
concluded between Canada and the United States in the wake of the
54. Mark C. Serreze et al., Perspectives on the Arctic's Shrinking Sea-ice
Cover, SCIENCE, Mar. 16, 2007, at 1533, 1536.
55. Vil'kitskii Strait is the most northerly located strait, and therefore normally
the most difficult one, in terms of ice conditions, to be negotiated by vessels plying
the Northern Sea Route. See generally Erik Franckx, Non-Soviet Shipping in the
Northeast Passage, and the Legal Status of Proliv Vil'kitskogo, 24 POLAR REc. 269
(1988).
56. See Serreze et al., supra note 54, at 1533 fig. 1.
57. See Kerr, supra note 47, at 34 fig. A plus.
58. These submissions were presented at the first seminar organized under the
project "The Capability of International Governance Systems in the Arctic to
Contribute to the Mitigation of Climate Change and Adjust to its Consequences"
(Aug. 30-Sep. 3, 2006), organized by Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland,
Rovaniemi, Finland. I presented a preliminary version of this Article in Pyhitunturi,
Finland on September 1, 2006.
59. Ted L. McDorman, A Canadian Perspective on the Continued Non-
Ratification of the Convention on the Law of the Sea by the United States, 43 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 393, 412 (2005).
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Polar Sea crossing in 1985, for instance, will no longer be sufficient to
regulate navigational issues between these two countries because this
agreement is restricted to the crossings of U.S. Coast Guard vessels
only.60 Third, the validity of the straight baselines, especially the exact
status of the waters so enclosed, will become topical once again.
Fourth, whether the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage can
be considered straits used for international navigation will become a
very acute and extremely difficult issue to solve. Fifth, as the melting
process continues to increase over time, coastal states' reliance on Art.
234 of the 1982 Convention ["Art. 234"] in order to restrict foreign
navigation in the area will become less and less effective.
Will the 1982 Convention, believed to constitute the applicable
legal regime, be able to take all these new concerns, triggered by
climate warming in the Arctic, into consideration to allow an orderly
development in the area? The next part will try to respond to this
question.
IV. VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
OF THE 1982 CONVENTION
A. Vulnerability
1. Low-level Vulnerability
The vulnerability of the 1982 Convention could be considered to
stem from the attempt of its drafters to draw up one single legal
instrument covering the whole law of the sea. This attempt is contrary
to the previous approach taken by the International Law Commission
when preparing the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea in 1958. The 1958 conference resulted in the adoption of four
nicely separated conventions, from which states could then pick and
choose, supplemented by an optional dispute settlement protocol. 61
The 1982 Convention, in contrast, intends to cover all activities in all
oceans, including the Arctic. The inclusion of the Arctic Ocean can be
60. See Agreement on Arctic Cooperation and Exchange of Notes Concerning
Transit of Northwest Passage, U.S.-Can., Jan. 11, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 141, 144-45
(entered into force Jan. 11, 1988).
61. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29,
1958, 504 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Sept. 10, 1964).
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inferred by the 1982 Convention's inclusion of a special section in
Part XII (Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment),
containing only one article with the same title as the section to which
it belongs-"ice-covered areas."62 The genesis of this particular article
clearly underlines that it was meant to be applied specifically to the
Arctic. 63 It is easy to question how one short, single article could
possibly deal with all the maritime issues of the Arctic, suggesting that
this document is flawed as a governing legal framework in that area.
As already implied in Part I, while looking at things this way may
be attractive to the layman, this approach can hardly be considered a
sensible one from an international law point of view. 64 As far as
navigation is concerned, the 1982 Convention clearly starts from the
premise-finally accepted by all Arctic states today, as argued in Part
I-that normal rules of navigation apply in that area as well. This
means that whether the issue concerns internal waters, baselines, bays,
straits, territorial seas, exclusive economic zones or high seas-to
name but the most salient ones-the relevant parts of the
62. 1982 Convention, supra note 3, at art. 234. Art. 234 reads:
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory
laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine
pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the
exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions
and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create
obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the
marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible
disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall
have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.
Id.
63. This article, which is sometimes referred to as "the Arctic article," was
negotiated directly between the three countries most concerned at the time, namely
Canada, the former Soviet Union, and the United States of America. See Article 234:
Ice-Covered Areas, in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
1982: A COMMENTARY 392, 393 (Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne,
Alexander Yankov & Neal R. Grandy eds., 1991).
64. The comparison between the Northwest Passage and the use of the
Mississippi River in order to come to grips with the applicable regime of navigation
in the former, may seem attractive at first sight, Christopher M. Macneill, Gaining
Command & Control of the Northwest Passage: Strait Talk on Sovereignty, 34
TRANSP. L.J. 355, 365 (2007), but lacks, however, any plausible legal justification
under contemporary international law.
2011] 411
15
Franckx: Should the Law Governing Maritime Areas in the Arctic Adapt to Ch
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2011
412 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
1982 Convention apply, as changed, where applicable, by the content
of Art. 234. But even beyond the mere navigational concerns, it might
suffice to illustrate the general applicability of this document by
referring to the intense media coverage accompanying the Russian
initiative during the summer of 2007 when one of its submarines
planted a flag on the bottom of the ocean at the North Pole. Of course,
a strategically sensitive area as the Arctic, such an action requires due
attention.65 But despite what the titles of newspaper articles might
have induced their readers to believe, this initiative did not set in
motion a new, totally unregulated wave of national sovereignty claims
to the Arctic proper resulting in bitter clashes with nobody out there to
impose a negotiated solution. Indeed, the 1982 Convention not only
created the legal justification for coastal states to establish sovereign
rights over the seabed and subsoil beyond the 200 n.m. limit, but it
also created a special body, the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, to help settle the outer limit of this area of state
authority. 66
The unitary character of this document is therefore, by itself, not
to be considered as a prohibiting factor, preventing this document
from securing an operational legal system in the Arctic. Instead, the
fact that the dispute settlement provisions form an integral part of the
package will prove to be a non-negligible advantage with respect to
navigational matters, a point further developed in Part IV.B. The
unitary character of the 1982 Convention can therefore be considered
to fall in the category of low-level vulnerabilities.
B. Medium-level Vulnerability
Nevertheless, one must admit that this basic approach of the 1982
Convention, whereby the general rules on the law of the sea apply to
the Arctic as well, with only one specific article solely devoted to the
area in question, may imply that this legal document "cannot be
seamlessly applied to the Arctic," as already mentioned.67 Indeed,
there are a number of examples that have an impact on navigation,
including the drawing of Arctic straight baselines by Canada and the
65. See generally James Stuhltrager, Global Climate Change and National
Security, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Winter 2008, at 36, 39-40.
66. 1982 Convention, supra note 3, at Annex II.
67. See Borgerson, supra note 9, at 72.
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former Soviet Union, which were either protested at the time of
enactment on paper 68 or thereafter in practice.69 Another example is
the claim to historic waters in the Arctic, which in Canada concerns
waters on the inside of those baselines, 70 but in Russia also possibly
concerns waters outside those baselines. Also, the reliance on the
sector lines with respect to maritime delimitation (which Canada relies
upon in its dispute with the United States, and Russia in its dispute
with Norway),71 as well as the question whether the Northern Sea
Route and Northwest Passage are, or could become, straits used for
international navigation, can be mentioned in this respect. Finally, the
issue of the correct application of Art. 234 (the only article in the
1982 Convention dealing exclusively with the Arctic, as already
mentioned) can be raised in this respect, especially since parts of it
can be considered as still being developed,72 such as its "due regard"
provision through the International Maritime Organization as
indicated below.
Most of these issues are highly contentious under present-day
international law. With respect to the conformity of the baselines to
international law, one finds arguments on both sides of the spectrum
in legal writings relating to Canada73 as well as Russia.74
68. The Canadian system of straight baselines triggered letters of protest by
the United States and the European Community. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W.
SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 118, 121 (2d
ed. 1996).
69. The Russian system north of the Eurasian continent was only challenged
by the United States in 1992 by means of one of its submarines. Id. at 100. Unlike
the regular application of U.S. Freedom of the Sea program, this particular challenge
apparently happened unintentionally. Erik Franckx, La collision entre deux sous-
marins, un americain et un russe, dans la baie de Kola (mer de Barents), 1992
ESPACES ET RESSOURCES MARITIMES 33, 47 (1993) (Fr.).
70. See, for instance, the writings of Professor Donat Pharand, who still
concludes that such a claim would not succeed on the historic title argument alone.
DONAT PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-125
(1988); Pharand, supra note 21, at 5-13.
71. VICTOR PRESCOTr & CLIVE SCHOFIELD, THE MARITIME POLITICAL
BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 525, 526 (2d ed. 2005).
72. Rob Huebert, Article 234 and Marine Pollution Jurisdiction in the Arctic,
in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND POLAR MARITIME DELIMITATION AND JURISDICTION,
supra note 34, at 249, 267.
73. Compare Tullio Scovazzi, The Baselines of the Territorial Sea: The
Practice of Arctic States, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND POLAR MARITIME
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The issue of historic waters has been labeled as "one of the most
controversial in the doctrine and practice relating to the law of the sea.
This remains an open question both in the Arctic and in other areas of
the world."75 Especially in Canada, the view that the melting of the ice
will diminish the strength of this historic internal waters claim has
found proponents 76 as well as opponents.77
So far, sector lines have been used only once in Arctic maritime
delimitation, namely in the 1990 Agreement concluded between the
former Soviet Union and the United States.78 This agreement, it
should be remembered, has only entered provisionally into force
because Russia has so far refused to ratify it. In the two other
instances mentioned above, parties disagree about the relevance of
sector lines in maritime boundary matters. Even though sector lines
have been qualified as the most distinctive feature of Arctic maritime
boundary delimitation, the final demise of this method has been
DELIMITATION AND JURISDICTION, supra note 34, at 69, 76-81, and PRESCOTT &
SCHOFIELD, supra note 71, at 520-21 (in conformity with international law), with
Daniel Vignes, La conformitd au droit de la mer des lignes de base droites tracies
par le Canada au nord du 70Wme paralkle nord, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A
TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 1005, 1019 (Yoram
Dinstein ed., 1989) ("I'histoire n'est pas present au rendez-vous" [History is not
present at the rendezvous]) (not in conformity with international law).
74. Compare R. Douglas Brubaker, The Legal Status of the Russian Baselines
in the Arctic, 30 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 191, 218 (1999)
(in conformity with international law), with Stuart B. Kaye, Territorial Sea
Baselines Along Ice-Covered Coasts: International Practice and Limits of the Law
of the Sea, 35 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 75, 81-82 (2004), and W. MICHAEL REISMAN
& GAYL S. WESTERMAN, STRAIGHT BASELINES IN MARITIME BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION 150-52 (1992) (not in conformity with international law).
75. Scovazzi, supra note 73, at 84.
76. See, e.g., Andrea Charron, The Northwest Passage: Is Canada's
Sovereignty Floating Away?, 60 INT'L J. 831, 847-48 (2005); Rob Huebert, Climate
Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage, 2001 ISUMA 86, 89;
Suzanne Lalonde, Increased Traffic Through Canadian Arctic Waters: Canada's
State ofReadiness, 38 REVUE JURIDIQUE THIMIS 49, 124 (2004).
77. Franklyn Griffiths, New Illusions of a Northwest Passage, in
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, THE ARCTIC AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 303, 303
(Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore & Alexander S. Skaridov eds., 2005);
Franklyn Griffiths, The Shipping News: Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Not on
Thinning Ice, 58 INT'L J. 257,257 (2003); McRae, supra note 2, at 21-22.
78. See Elizabeth G. Verville, United States-Soviet Union (Report Number 1-
6), in 1 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 2, at 447.
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predicted, as Canada and Russia will find a solution with their
neighbors for their remaining Arctic maritime boundary disputes.7 9
Whether the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage
should be considered straits used for international navigation is an
issue still as hotly debated now as it was more than twenty years
ago.80 How underwater navigation by submarines may impact this
discussion is also hotly debated. It might be telling that in a recent
article, an American scholar subtly referred to the statement-that the
Northwest Passage had just been opened by two U.S. atomic
submarines-by the chairman of the U.S. delegation to the second
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1960.82 Military
cooperation between the American and Canadian armed forces only
further complicates this issue. 83
Finally, since Art. 234 has been negotiated directly between
Canada, the former Soviet Union and the United States-countries
with totally opposing interests in the area-it should not come as a
surprise that problems of interpretation remain. In fact, this article has
been described from the start as "probably the most ambiguous, if not
controversial, clause in the entire treaty," 84 or in a more metaphorical
manner as "a witch's brew, a caldron of legal uncertainty which could
be stirred in favour of either the coastal or shipping state."" The
analysis by the Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction Relating to
Marine Pollution of the International Law Association, as reproduced
79. Alex G. Oude Elferink, Arctic Maritime Delimitations: The
Preponderance of Similarities with Other Regions, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND
POLAR MARITIME DELIMITATION AND JURISDICTION, supra note 34, at 179, 198.
80. Michael A. Becker, International Law of the Sea, 41 INT'L L. 671, 679-80
(2007) (describing new tensions in the Northwest Passage).
81. See, e.g., Donald M. McRae, Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction?, in
CANADA'S CHANGING NORTH 427 (William C. Wonders ed., 2003) [hereinafter
McRae, CHANGING NORTH]; McRae, supra note 2, at 15, 18-19, 21.
82. See Bernard H. Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea,
100 AM. J. INT'L L. 830, 849 n.105 (2006).
83. See Michael Byers, Canadian Armed Forces Under United States
Command, 58 INT'L J. 89, 95, 112-13 (2002).
84. Cynthia Lamson, Arctic Shipping, Marine Safety and Environmental
Protection. 11 MARINE POL'Y 3, 4 (1987).
85. Cynthia Lamson & David VanderZwaag Arctic Waters: Needs and
Options for Canadian-American Cooperation, 18 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L. 49, 81
(1987).
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in its final report of 2000, gives a good overview of these many
difficulties of interpretation. 86 Despite the legal framework available,
are we still lost at sea if the only article specifically applicable to the
Arctic does not really provide clear and firm guidance?
It is not the goal of this Article to try to give concrete answers to
the above-mentioned outstanding Arctic issues in the framework of
the 1982 Convention, based on a detailed legal analysis. Moreover,
space limitations would not allow for such an analysis. This Article's
purpose is simply to illustrate that the 1982 Convention certainly has
its vulnerabilities, and that the lack of specificity may be considered
one of them. Certainly, if the law is not clear and is open to broadly
diverging interpretations, states will naturally try to construe the law
in a way most advantageous to their own situation. With respect to the
legal nature of the Northwest Passage, it has, for instance, even been
doubted whether the 1982 Convention provides the definitive
answer.87 Since these national claims appear to be developed praeter
or secundum legem, they are qualified as medium-level vulnerabilities
for the purpose of this study.
C. High-level Vulnerability
Even more than the lack of specificity, the real vulnerability of the
1982 Convention is believed to stem from the attempts of certain
coastal states to unilaterally try to change the content of certain
convention provisions, which was set up as a package deal from which
no derogations are allowed.88 This trend of so-called creeping
jurisdiction-which at times has put pressure on the 1982 Convention
in other areas89 -certainly existed in the Arctic in the past, 90 and still
86. ERIK FRANCKX, VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION AND COASTAL STATE
JURISDICTION: THE WORK OF THE ILA JURISDICTION RELATING TO MARINE
POLLUTION (1991-2000), at 100-05 (2001).
87. See generally McRae, CHANGING NORTH, supra note 81.
88. This document, it must be remembered, does not allow for reservations or
exceptions, unless explicitly allowed by it. See 1982 Convention, supra note 3, at
art. 309.
89. For more about the pressure placed on the 200-mile limit, see, for instance,
my recent writings including: Erik Franckx, The 200-mile Limit: Between Creeping
Jurisdiction and Creeping Common Heritage?, 48 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 117 (2005);
Erik Franckx, 200 morskikh mil' i polzuchaia iurisdiktsiia [200 n.m. Limit and
Creeping Jurisdiction], 25 MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO [MEZ. PRA.] 206 (2006)
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has a tendency to resurface there. Indeed, in some instances the
normal reading of the law does appear to be clear. Nevertheless, states
develop arguments with respect to such clear provisions, no longer
secundum or praeter legem, but rather contra legem. One such
example will be given for each of the two gate holders of Arctic
shipping, namely Canada and Russia.
1. Canada
As far as Canada is concerned, the application of Article 8,
Section 2 of the 1982 Convention ("Art. 8 (2)") springs to mind. This
Article reads as follows: "[W]here the establishment of a straight
baseline in accordance with the method set forth in article 7 [(straight
baselines)] has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which
had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent
passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters." 91
It seems undeniable that before drawing straight baselines in 1985,
Canada did not consider the waters on the inside of these baselines as
internal waters. The mere fact that the governmental reaction to the
Manhattan crisis between 1969 and 1970 consisted, inter alia, of
enlarging the territorial sea to 12 n.m. (in order to be able to better
control shipping at the east and west entrances of the Northwest
Passage) appears to be sufficient proof of the matter.92
One detailed argument suggests that as long as Canada was not a
party to the 1982 Convention, Art. 8 (2) did not apply to it.93 Yet, it
appeared logical to conclude that if Canada became a party to this
legal instrument, Art. 8 (2) would fully apply. As mentioned above,
the latter happened in 2003.94 But, Pharand now comes to the
(Russ.); Erik Franckx, 200 n.m. Limit and Creeping Jurisdiction, 2005 EZHEGODNIK
MORSKOGO PRAVA 63 (2006) (Russ.); Erik Franckx. 200 n.m. Limit and Creeping
Jurisdiction. MEZ. PRA. 235 (2006) (Russ.); Erik Franckx, The 200-mile Limit:
Between Creeping Jurisdiction and Creeping Common Heritage? Some Law of the
Sea Considerations from Professor Louis Sohn's Former LL.M Student, 39 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REv. 467 (2007).
90. See FRANCKX, supra note 2, at 298.
91. 1982 Convention, supra note 3, at art. 8, § 2.
92. See, e.g., FRANCKX, supra note 2, at 10 1-07.
93. See PHARAND, supra note 70, at 113-25.
94. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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conclusion that these baselines were drawn nearly twenty years before
Canada joined the 1982 Convention. 95 At that time, Canada was not
bound by Art. 8 (2) or the corresponding rule of the 1958 Convention
(to which Canada was not a party), nor a corresponding rule of
customary law.96 The argument is that the rule contained in Art. 8 (2)
is not automatically compulsory for all parties to the 1982
Convention, but only for those who established straight baselines after
they became a party to the 1982 Convention.97 A similar line of
reasoning can also be found in the writings of other Canadian
authors.9 8 These authors sometimes stress the fact that the explicit
wording "in accordance with . .. article 7," to be found in Art. 8 (2),
further exonerates Canada in a more formal sense because it did not
establish its system of straight baselines in 1985 on the legal basis of
article 7 ("Art. 7"), since it was not yet a party to the 1982
Convention. 99
The substantive argument seems rather strange, as it would imply,
for instance, that if a country like Peru were to become a party to the
1982 Convention tomorrow, it could claim that article 3, establishing a
maximum territorial sea width of 12 n.m., would not be applicable to
it. At the time Peru claimed a 200 n.m. zone, it was neither bound by
this article, nor by the 1958 Convention (indirectly limiting the
territorial sea to a maximum of 12 n.m.), nor by customary
international law (the exact content of which was at that time very
much contested). This kind of intertemporal application of the
1982 Convention stands at odds with the package deal approach,
which forms its backbone. Or, as more generally stated by one author:
"This [Canadian] approach is unconvincing; otherwise, the entire
range of excessive claims predating the 1982 Convention similarly
would be permissible-creating a global crazy quilt of conflicting
maritime claims and defeating the purpose of the [1982] Convention
95. Pharand, supra note 21, at 43.
96. See Pharand, supra note 21, at 42-44.
97. See McRae, supra note 2, at 13-14.
98. See Michael Byers, Internationales Recht und Internationale Politik in der
Nordwestpassage: Konsequenzen des Klimawandels, 67 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [ZAORV] 145, 152
(2007) (Ger.).
99. Lalonde, supra note 76, at 78-79.
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as 'one gigantic package deal."' 00 Also, the more formalistic
argument, based on the explicit reference to Art. 7, is not really
convincing because Art. 8 (2) simply refers to "the method" set forth
in Art. 7, not that particular article of that particular convention.
2. Russia
With respect to Russia, a non-negligible issue concerns the exact
field of application of the Russian regulations concerning the Northern
Sea Route.' 0 By itself, the concept of the Northern Sea Route is not
free from ambiguity when compared to the related notion of the
Northeast Passage. Authors very often find it essential to stress the
importance of the difference, but when trying to explain the
distinguishing elements the picture becomes rather hazy. 102 As it
presently stands, the Northern Sea Route forms part, be it a basic part,
of the Northeast Passage, which is the larger entity. 103
This primarily has to do with the horizontal extent of both
seaways. The Northern Sea Route is said to start in the Arctic in the
west from the western entrances of Novaia Zemlia, 104 whereas the
100. James Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest
Passage, 22 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 257, 272 (2007).
101. MARINE & ENV'T LAW INST., GOVERNANCE OF ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING
63 (2008), available at http://archive.arcticportal.org/391/01/AMSA-Shipping-
Governance-Final-Report---Revised-November-2008.pdf.
102. See, e.g., KOROLEVA ET AL. supra note 22, at 48-49, 98-99; Timchenko,
supra note 25, at 31; Leonid Timchenko, The Northern Sea Route: Russian
Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Seas, in THE LAW OF THE
SEA AND POLAR MARITIME DELIMITATION AND JURISDICTION, supra note 34, at 269,
269-71.
103. See Alexander G. Granberg, Vladimir V. Mikhailichenko, Vsevolod I.
Peresypkin & Alexander P. Ushakov, Istoriia Severnogo morskogo puti [History of
the Northern Sea Route], in PROBLEMY SEVERNOGO MORSKOGO PUTI, supra note 2,
at 9, 9-10. The Northeast Passage can therefore be described as covering all
maritime areas north of the Eurasian continent and limited by the maritime boundary
with Norway to the West, the maritime boundary with the US to the East, and the
North Pole to the North.
104. 1990 Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea
Route, approved by USSR Minister of Merchant Marine, Sept. 14, 1990, available
at
http://www.morflot.ru/about/sevmorput/en/ (follow the "Rules of Navigation.doc"
hyperlink for English translation).
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Northeast Passage also includes the Barents Sea. However, recent
statements made by the Director of the Northern Sea Route
Administration, A. Gorshkovsky---declaring that the 1996 Guide to
Navigation (applicable to the Northern Sea Route) also applies to the
ice-covered parts of the Barents Sea' 05_and, inter alia, the editors of
a recent authoritative book on the Northern Sea Route-stating that
the Route's "ftnctional boundaries" extend to the ice-covered parts of
the southeastern Barents Sea' 06-seem to blur the only remaining
clear distinction between the Northeast Passage and the Northern Sea
Route.
When one looks at the difference in vertical application of the
Northeast Passage and the Northern Sea Route, one runs into even
more difficulties. Because the present-day Russian legislation
applicable to the Northern Sea Route is based on the extended
competence granted to coastal states in ice-covered areas in
accordance with Art. 234, it normally implies that the application of
this particular legal framework should be restricted to the 200 n.m.
exclusive economic zone. Everything beyond that falls under the
concept of the Northeast Passage. However, when the 1990
Regulations were established, it was argued that the Northern Sea
Route varies great distances in latitude depending on the ice
conditions-sometimes even passing through portions of the high
seas.' 07 Today, this position seems to be the prevailing attitude in
Russian doctrine, reflected not only in the specialized literature on the
105. ANATOLY GORSHKOVSKY, RULES TO BE FOLLOWED ON THE NORTHERN
SEA RouTE (DELIVERABLE NO. D.6.1 IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARCTIC
OPERATIONAL PLATFORM PROJECT; PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP HELD ON 25
MARCH 2003, HELSINKI, FINLAND) 27-28 (2003). The 1996 Guide to Navigation
includes the full text of the 1990 Regulations, as well as the 1996 Regulations and
Requirements, constituting the present legal regime applicable to the Northern Sea
Route. See MARINE & ENv'T LAW INST., supra note 101, at 62-67.
106. See Granberg et al., supra note 103, at 10; Alexander G. Granberg,
Vladimir V. Mikhailichenko, Vsevolod I. Peresypkin & Alexander P. Ushakov,
O kontseptsii razvitiia Severnogo morskogo puti [On the Concept of the
Development of the Northern Sea Route], in PROBLEMY SEVERNOGO MORSKOGO
PUTI, supra note 2, at 502, 503.
107. Anatoliy L. Kolodkin & M.E. Volosov, The Legal Regime of the Soviet
Arctic: Major Issues, 14 MARINE POL'Y 158, 164 (1990).
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law of the sea,"os but also in general works on international law.109
The Russian practice of experimenting with variants to the standard
itineraries normally followed by ships plying the Northern Sea
Route'l 0 seems to be particularly relevant in this respect.'I'
All of this seems to boil down to the position that in the Arctic,
the Northern Sea Route equates to the Northeast Passage-certainly
east of the western entrances to Novaia Zemlia as already suggested in
certain western publications,11 2 and maybe even including large parts
of the Barents Sea. How all this is to be reconciled with the
straightforward notions of Art. 234, using terminology such as "within
the limits of the exclusive economic zone" and "the presence of ice
covering such areas for most of the year," 1 3 is extremely hard to
understand.
Since such examples seem to contradict the basic legal framework
applicable in the Arctic, they have been qualified as high-level
vulnerabilities for the purpose of the present paper.
108. V. N. GUTSULIAK, MEZHDUNARODNOE MORSKOE PRAVO (PUBLICHNOE I
CHASTNOE) [INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (PUBLIC AND PRIVATE)] 96-98
(2006); KOLODKIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 264.
109. IGOR I. LUKASHUK, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO: OSOBENNAIA CHAST'
[INTERNATIONAL LAW: SPECIAL PART] (2005).
110. This practice involves either circumnavigating some or all of the Russian
Arctic islands to the north-called transit voyages-or crossing the North Pole
area-called trans-Arctic voyages.
111. S. V. Brestkin et al., Prirodnye usloviia na trassakh Severnogo morskogo
puti [Natural Conditions on the Itineraries of the Northern Sea Route], in
PROBLEMY SEVERNOGO MORSKOGO PUTI, supra note 2, at 106, 127-33.
112. See Brubaker, supra note 74, at 208; R. DOUGLAS BRUBAKER, THE
RUSSIAN ARCTIC STRAITS 6-14 (2005) [hereinafter Brubaker, ARCTIC STRAITS];
PETER OREBECH & R. DOUGLAS BRUBAKER, LEGAL STATUS OF THE NSR: STATE OF
THE ART REPORT (DELIVERABLE No. D2.1.1 IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARCTIC
OPERATIONAL PLATFORM PROJECT) 6 (2006). Each of the aforementioned sources
depict the Northern Sea Route by means of a line running from the northern tip of
Novaia Zemlia, up to the North Pole, and then back to the Bering Strait.
113. 1982 Convention, supra note 2, at art. 234. Warming ocean temperatures
(3 degrees Celsius since 1980 in winter) have been held responsible for a decrease in
winter-ice in the Barents Sea, which will lead to even less summer ice in the future.
Rising Surface Temperatures Drive Back Winter Ice in Barents Sea, SCIENCE DAILY,
Sept. 20, 2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/09/070917172937.htm.
Taking into account the prevailing ocean currents in the southeastern part of the
Barents Sea, the timing of this proposed extension of the legal regime of the
Northern Sea Route is unfortunate.
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B. Adaptive Capacity
In view of all these vulnerabilities of the 1982 Convention, the
next question I address is whether this document, and the atypical
regime it represents, possesses sufficient adaptive capacity to alleviate
these new strains global warming poses upon the Arctic navigation
regime.
Indeed, the 1982 Convention is different from many other
international agreements in that it neither bestows a specifically
established body nor the conference of the parties with the specific
task of developing the instrument itself. Even though the conference
of the parties is mentioned in article 319, this body has merely been
attributed with administrative powers relating to appointments or
financial matters. Whether this body also has the power to review the
functioning of the 1982 Convention itself is far from clear since
widely diverging opinions exist among states in this respect. 114
Furthermore, no procedure to further develop the instrument through
protocols or annexes has been included in this document; only an
amendment procedure (articles 312-16) is provided, which appears
rather difficult to apply in practice.115 Despite these specificities, the
overall adaptive capacity of this document has not been considered
inferior to other dynamic or living instruments. A substantial mix of
additional legally binding agreements-whether universal or
regional-and soft law clearly make the 1982 Convention a non self-
contained legal regime.116 The general adaptive capacity of the latter
regime finds no exception in the Arctic, as will be argued next.
114. See, e.g., Alexander G. Oude Elferink, Reviewing the Implementation of
the LOS Convention: The Role of the United Nations General Assembly and the
Meeting of States Parties, in 44 OCEANS MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND RESPONSES 295 (Alexander G. Oude Elferink &
Donald. R. Rothwell eds., 2004).
115. David Freestone & Alexander G. Oude Elferink, Flexibility and
Innovation in the Law of the Sea: Will the LOS Convention Amendment Procedures
Ever be Used?, in STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE ROLE OF
THE LOS CONVENTION 169, 173-83 (Alexander G. Oude Elferink ed., 2005).
116. Alan Boyle, Further Developments of the Law of the Sea Convention:
Mechanisms for Change, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 563, 584 (2005) [hereinafter
Boyle, Mechanisms]; Alan Boyle, Further Development of the 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea: Mechanisms for Change, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS
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It is believed that this document is rather well equipped to deal
with the different possible scenarios, especially as far as navigation in
the Arctic is concerned. First of all, one may not forget that Art. 234 is
quite exceptional in the overall framework of the 1982 Convention.
Art. 234 is the only place where national rules concerning vessel-
source pollution need not conform to generally accepted international
rules and standards. 1 17 Art. 234 implies that if Arctic shipping picks
up, the coastal states retaining control over the Northern Sea Route
and the Northwest Passage will have ample room to protect their
maritime zones. At the same time, however, it must be noted that
coastal states' extensive powers are not totally discretionary, for Art.
234 contains the obligation that they give "due regard to
navigation,""' while establishing their laws and regulations
concerning shipping.
The flexibility included in this notion enhances the adaptive
capacity of the article. The fact that the parties involved will very
often have a different interpretation of this vague notion is not to be
considered an added vulnerability; Art. 234 remains subject to the
system of compulsory dispute settlement, as stressed by Conclusion
No. 14 of the Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction Relating to
Marine Pollution of the International Law Association.' 19 If shipping
increases in the future, a neutral third party appointed in accordance
with Part XV of the 1982 Convention (Settlement of Disputes) will
always be able to give concrete content to this vague notion, balancing
the interests of both the coastal state and the flag state. Or, as stated by
one author:
As these duties of due regard are mutually applicable, the potential
for them to regulate a dispute between users is slight. It is only
when due regard obligations can be subjected to third-party
procedures that the possibility exists for these duties to have a
AND PROSPECTS 40, 52-55 (David Freestone, Richard Barnes & David M. Ong eds.,
2006) [hereinafter Boyle, Further Development].
117. BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIvE ECONOMIC ZONE IN
THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 176 (1989).
118. Id.
119. See FRANCKX, supra note 86, at 104.
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meaningful application that would take into account the differing
circumstances.120
The ultimate purpose of Part XV is to balance the coastal state
powers granted in Parts V (Exclusive Economic Zone) and XII
(Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment) to the
advantage of the freedom of navigation. 121 While Art. 234 leaves large
discretion to the coastal state when regulating navigation in
ice-infested waters, it clearly does not give the coastal state carte
blanche; thus, if shipping were to increase in the future, it allows for
the orderly development of the law. The guidelines in the framework
of the International Maritime Organization for ships operating in ice-
covered waters,122 as well as the additional work by the International
Association of Classification Societies in this respect, 123 may already
be considered a multilateral effort trying to give concrete content to
this notion of due regard in the framework of Art. 234.124 Part XV of
the 1982 Convention was primarily accepted by its founding fathers in
order to "maintain the integrity of the Convention's compromise
package."l 25 Art. 234 forms a case in point as far as the practical
implementation of this general policy is concerned. Moreover, the
interpretation given to such terms is not ex tunc, but ex nunc; so, if
shipping increases as a result of climate change, "due regard" will
have to be interpreted in a context of increased navigation and not in
that of the sporadic journeys as they existed in 1982 when this
120. NATALIE KLEIN, DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA 139 (2005).
121. Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention:
Problems ofFragmentation and Jurisdiction, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 37, 42 (1997).
122. Int'l Mar. Org. [IMO], Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-
Covered Waters, MSC/Circ. 1056 (Dec. 23, 2002), available at
http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcill 056-MEPC-Circ399.pdf.
123. Oystein Jensen, Arctic Shipping Guidelines: Towards a Legal Regime for
Navigation Safety and Environmental Protection?, 44 POLAR REC. 107, 110 (2008).
124. See Huebert, supra note 72, at 263-66. Being a non-legal document, this
should, however, only be considered a first effort. What about: This document
should, however, only be considered a first effort because it is a non-legal document
125. John E. Noyes, Compulsory Third-Party Adjudication and the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 675, 682
(1989).
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convention was concluded. Such terms, in other words, allow an
evolutionary interpretation. 126
The only article of the 1982 Convention exclusively dealing with
the Arctic seems especially well suited to take into account climate
change not only in a medium, but also in a long-term perspective. As
further warming, in a first phase, will most probably make ice-breaker
assisted navigation more plausible, the situation just described will
apply. But if in the long run not only ice-free summers, but maybe
even ice-free winters were to become a reality, the adaptive capacity
of Art. 234 appears to be extremely well suited to take into
consideration such new developments as well. It must be remembered
that the notion of Arctic waters is nowhere used in the article; it only
mentions "ice-covered areas," which has been defined in the article
itself, as already mentioned above, as "ice covering such areas for
most of the year."1 27 So, even were ice to disappear completely in the
Arctic, this article would be well adapted to the different steps in the
climatic process leading up to that eventuality. The article would
simply stop being operative any longer somewhere along that process,
implying that no specific coastal state powers are needed anymore and
these Arctic waters would become totally governed by the normal
rules of navigation to be found elsewhere in the 1982 Convention.
Since there appears to be no good reason why Art. 8 (2) should be
excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement part of the 1982
Convention, it seems that those issues that have been characterized as
high-level vulnerabilities are covered by Part XV. Therefore, these
high-level vulnerabilities should not normally disturb the navigational
regime if and when that navigational regime becomes fully
operational. Instead, all these issues would be solved by making use of
the procedures explicitly provided by the 1982 Convention for those
purposes.
Part III (Straits used for International Navigation) should not be
excluded from the system of compulsory dispute settlement either,
especially since it squarely relates to the freedom of navigation. The
same, in principle, holds true with respect to the issue of straight
baselines. However, if straight baselines were tangled up with other
issues, such as historic waters or maritime boundary delimitation, it
126. See Boyle, Further Development, supra note 116, at 44-49.
127. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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would be for the body competent under Article 287 to decide how to
characterize the dispute in question.128 Indeed, Canada and Russia
have listed historic bays and titles, as well as maritime boundary
delimitations, as optional exceptions under Article 298.129 The United
States, if it ever becomes a party to the 1982 Convention, will very
likely act accordingly.' 30 Consequently, these latter issues will remain
without a solution if the parties cannot find common ground in a
negotiated manner; however, the vulnerability of these issues in the
Arctic can hardly be considered as specific to that area.
Moreover, the qualification of the 1982 Convention as the
Constitution for the Oceans, as previously mentioned, should not give
the impression that further developments are especially hard or even
impossible to reach. Indeed, constitutions come in different forms and
while some of them have proven difficult to amend, others have been
changed on a rather regular basis. The 1982 Convention clearly falls
into the latter category, for it has already been "implemented"
twice.131 Nothing prevents it from being "implemented" a third time,
if this should prove necessary. And though some have suggested this
should happen with respect to the Arctic in general,132 I am not
convinced that such development should be envisaged at present, and
certainly not in order to be able to cope with future navigational
issues. Of course, the conclusion of regional agreements, which the
1982 Convention does not preclude, is always possible. Scholars
128. See KLEIN, supra note 120, at 272-73.
129. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., JOE BIDEN, CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, S. EXEC.
Doc. No. 110-9 (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
1 10erpt9/pdf/CRPT-1 10erpt9.pdf.
131. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, opened for
signature July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 28, 1996),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/unclos/
closindxAgree.htm; Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, adopted Aug. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (entered into force Dec. 11,
2001).
132. Barry Hart Dubner, On the Basis for Creation of a New Method of
Defining International Jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, 13 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 1, 18 (2005).
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contend that the regional agreements constitute "a significant source
of further development of the law of the sea."l 33 Once again, the
Arctic forms no exception, as a certain interplay with the 1982
Convention has already been noted.134 These regional agreements can
encompass either the involvement of competent international
organizations, in casu the International Maritime Organization, or
regional navigational arrangements, as suggested by others,' 35 so long
as these regional agreements comply with Article 311 of the 1982
Convention. As already mentioned, the 2002 Guidelines may provide
a good example of the former.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Starting out from the predicted climate change, indicating that ice
cover in the Arctic Ocean will continue to diminish during the years to
come, this Article highlights some navigational concerns that will
most certainly require increased international attention in the future.
Even though the exact timing may remain open to conjecture at
present, the fact that these issues will arrive on the international
agenda seems generally accepted.
This Article also highlights the vulnerabilities of the international
legal regime based on the 1982 Convention, which seems to be
generally accepted by all major players in the Arctic today as
containing the basic legal rules governing the area. For mere
didactical purposes, a distinction was made between low, medium and
high-level vulnerabilities. This Article reaches the conclusion that the
listed high-level vulnerabilities, as well as a good number of medium-
level vulnerabilities, can be solved in a satisfactory manner on the
basis of the 1982 Convention itself. Other medium-level
vulnerabilities, it must be admitted, cannot; but this difficulty is not
specific to the Arctic region. It is nevertheless presumed that if
navigation really starts to pick up in the Arctic, the coastal states will
feel the urge to further their efforts at arriving at a negotiated solution
with more vigor, whether it concerns maritime boundary questions or
more strict navigational issues. In a region as sensitive as the Arctic,
133. See Boyle, Mechanisms, supra note 116, at 575.
134. See Olav Schram Stokke, A Legal Regime for the Arctic? Interplay with
the Law of the Sea Convention, 31 MARINE POL'Y 402 (2007).
135. See BRUBAKER, ARCTIC STRAITS, supra note 112, at 6-14.
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for instance, the grounding of a vessel in a contested zone might easily
trigger similar heated reactions as between Greece and Turkey during
the mid-1990s, even in the absence of territorial disputes over
islands. 136 With respect to navigational issues as such, the
transformation of the 2002 Guidelines into a legally binding document
should be envisaged.137
The submission is therefore made that the 1982 Convention
appears to have enough adaptive capacity to develop increased
navigation into the Arctic in an orderly manner once it occurs. Now
that all directly interested players finally accept the 1982 Convention
as the basic legal regime governing the Arctic, it would be
counterproductive to create a totally novel legal instrument. It is
hoped the obligation for state parties to settle most future disputes in
this area in accordance with the Part XV of the 1982 Convention will
break the vicious circle of unilateral action-reaction, which has been
so typical of the development of the Arctic navigational matters so far.
It is therefore hoped that the United States will become a party to this
document before the Arctic really opens up. The possibility of
increased navigation in the Arctic adds one more good reason to the
already long list of reasons why the U.S. Senate should give its advice
and consent to this document.
136. See Martin Pratt & Clive Schofield, The Imia/Kardak Rocks Dispute in
the Aegean Sea, 4 BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL. 62 (1996); Constantin Economids, Les
ilots d'Imia dans la Mer Egee: un differend crde par la force [Imia Islets in the
Aegean: A Dispute Created by Force], 101 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 323 (1997) (Fr.).
137. See Jensen, supra note 123, at 113.
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POST-SCRIPTUM
Since the spring of 2008, a number of developments have
occurred that are worth pinpointing in a succinct manner with
appropriate references1 38 in order to allow the reader to update the
above-made legal analysis. Some of these developments were covered
in the French version of this Article that appeared in 2009, which
primarily concerned two documents-a joint document emanating from
the five Arctic rim countries and one policy paper prepared by the
Commission of the European Union.139 The so-called Ilulissat
Declaration of the five Arctic countries is important because it
emphasizes that, in the opinion of Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia
and the United States, the 1982 Convention provides a solid and, at
the same time, sufficient foundation to regulate the Arctic in a
responsible manner. 140 The communication of the Commission of the
European Union of November 20, 2008, even though a little bit more
nuanced, nevertheless starts from the same premise: the 1982
Convention should be the basis of any further legal developments. 141
In addition to the developments mentioned in the 2009 French
version of this Article, there are several other developments to
138. All of these references are to English documents, except as otherwise
indicated.
139. Erik Franckx, L'Arctique. Du changement climatique au changement
juridique?, in L'tVOLUTION ET L'tTAT ACTUEL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA
MER. MELANGES DE DROIT DE LA MER OFFERTS A DANIEL VIGNES 299, 302, 303
(Raefael Casado Raigon & Guiseppe Cataldi, eds., 2009).
140. This declaration was adopted at Ilulissat, Greenland by the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the above-mentioned countries on May 28, 2008. Ilulissat
Declaration, adopted May 28, 2008, available at http://arctic-
council.org/filearchive/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf.
141. Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council: The European Union and the Arctic Region, at 9-10, COM (2008) 763
final (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0763:FIN:en:PDF. That this document is
nevertheless more nuanced is demonstrated by the following policy objective: "The
full implementation of already existing obligations, rather than proposing new legal
instruments should be advocated. This however should not preclude work on further
developing some of the frameworks, adapting them to new conditions or Arctic
specificities." Id. at 10.
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consider. First, on January 20, 2011, the European Parliament adopted
a non-legislative resolution, entitled "A Sustainable EU Policy for the
High North," in response to the aforementioned communication of the
Commission. 142
Secondly, all Arctic rim countries, with the exception of Norway,
which already enacted its Arctic policy on December 1, 2006,143 have
only issued such Arctic policy statements since the spring of 2008
(Denmark (May 2008),144 Canada (July 26, 2008),145 the Russian
Federation (September 18, 2008)146 and the United States (January 9,
2009)). 147 And once again, a recent study analyzing and comparing
these five national Arctic policies starts from the assumption that "the
142. European Parliament Resolution of 20 January 2011 on a Sustainable EU
Policy for the High North (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2011-0024. The
1982 Convention is the first document to which this resolution has regard to in the
preamble. Id.
143. NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE NORWEGIAN
GOVERNMENT'S HIGH NORTH STRATEGY 6 (2006), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/strategien.pdf.
144. NAMMINERSORNERULLUTIK OQARTUSSAT UDENRIGSMINISTERIET
[MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (OF DENMARK) AND THE HOME RULE
GOVERNMENT (OF GREENLAND)], ARKTIS I EN BRYDNINGSTID: FORSLAG TIL
STRATEGI FOR AKTIVITETER I DET ARKTISKE OMRADE [THE ARCTIC AT A TIME OF
TRANSITION: PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION] (2008),
available at http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/962AFDC2-30CE-412D-B7C7-
070241C7D9D8/0/ARKTISKSTRATEGI.pdf.
145. Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty
and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad, FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE
CAN. (last updated on Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-
polaire/canada arctic foreignpolicy_booklet-lapolitique etrangere ducanada
pour_ arctiquelivret.aspx?lang-eng.
146. Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Arktike na period
do 2020 goda i dal'neishuiu perspektivu [Fundamentals of State Policy of the
Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period up to 2020 and Beyond],
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html (last modified June 26, 2010) (confirmed
by the President of the Russian Federation, D. Medvedev on Sept. 18, 2008).
147. Directive on Arctic Region Policy, 45 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 47
(Jan. 12, 2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2009_presidentialdocuments&docid=pdl9ja09_txt-l l.pdf.
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legal framework governing the Arctic issues is the law of the sea,
which is reflected in the [1982 Convention]." 48
Thirdly, a maritime delimitation agreement concluded between
Norway and the Russian Federation and was signed on September 15,
2010.149 The joint statement by the respective Foreign Ministers
announcing the breakthrough on April 27, 2007 already referred to the
Ilulissat Declaration,15 0 which indicates that both parties considered
the 1982 Convention the basis on which the parties reached this
delimitation agreement. This conclusion was also stressed by the
Foreign Ministers in a column in the French newspaper Le Monde in
early October 2010, commenting on the recently reached delimitation
agreement.'' In this respect, the concluding remarks of a recent study
on this agreement are worth mentioning:
The Norway-Russia delimitation treaty will probably have few
concrete implications for other existing and future maritime
delimitation disputes. Nevertheless, the treaty confirms the
statements of the five Arctic coastal states (The United States,
Canada, Demark, Russia, and Norway) in the 2008 Ilulissat
Declaration that the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas are
subjected to a comprehensive legal framework through the law of
148. Ian G. Brosnan, Thomas M. Leschine & Edward L. Miles, Cooperation
or Conflict in a Changing Arctic?, 42 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 173, 175 (2011).
149. Treaty Between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation
Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the
Arctic Ocean, Nor.-Russ., Sept. 15, 2010, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/
upload/ SMKiVedlegg/2010/avtale engelsk.pdf
150. Joint Statement on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents
Sea and the Arctic Ocean, para. 2, Nor.-Russ., Apr. 27, 2007, available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/030427 english 4.pdf.
151. Segel Lavrov & Jonas Gahr Store, Gestion de l'Arctique : la coop&ation
doit l'emporter sur la confrontation [The Management of the Arctic : Cooperation
Must Prevail Over Confrontation], LE MONDE (Fr.), Oct. 6, 2010, at 19. The only
subtitle of the article "Base juridique indispensable" (Crucial Legal Basis) focuses
on the 1982 Convention. Even though other agreements can possibly supplement the
1982 Convention, the latter represents the primary legal basis on which future
negotiations regarding cooperation on Arctic related matters will have to be based.
Id.
2011] 431
35
Franckx: Should the Law Governing Maritime Areas in the Arctic Adapt to Ch
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2011
432 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
the sea and their commitment to settle overlapping claims in an
orderly way1 52
All these novel elements, in other words, seem to confirm the gist
of this Article. The only caveat seems to be a dissonant stream in
Russian scholarship opining that Russia should not make a second
submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
because Part XI of the 1982 Convention, entitled "The Area," is not
applicable to the Arctic.153 No matter how interesting a detailed
analysis of this strand of argumentation might appear from a legal
point of view, it will suffice for present purposes to simply mention it
here as a concluding remark of this post-script, while postponing a
more substantive analysis for the time being.
152. Tore Henriksen & Geir Ulfstein, Maritime Delimiatation in the Arctic:
The Barents Sea Treaty, 42 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 10 (2011).
153. See, e.g., Ivan V. Bunik, Alternative Approaches to the Delimitation of
the Arctic Continental Shelf 2008 INT'L ENERGY L. REv. 114, 125.
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